Nuclear Non-Proliferation working group led by Dr Alec Gaines
posted 28th August 2008
WORLD FEDERATION OF UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATIONS
FEDERATION MONDIALE DES ASSOCIATIONS POUR LES NATIONS UNIES
A peoples’ movement for the United Nations
STUDENTS FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE WORLD CONFERENCE
Geneva, 13-16 July 2008
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Dr. Hans Blix, President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, welcomed the winning students of a global essay, video and poster competition to a conference in Geneva to work together on the question of how to free the world of nuclear weapons. A statement from H.E. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Director-General of the Palais des Nations was read out and a video message by Mr. Sergio Duarte, the UN High Representative for Disarmament, was shown.
The World Academy of Art and Science (WAAS), conference co-sponsor, was represented by Mr. John Cox and Mr. Robert Berg, who warmly appreciated the thoughtfulness of the students’ ideas and encouraged them to have confidence in their ability to make a difference.
The winning students came from Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, China, Colombia, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia and USA. The final selection was made by a committee chaired by The Hon. Douglas Roche, on the recommendation of the NGO Committees on Disarmament in New York and Geneva.
The program for the students was intensive and enabled them to interact with disarmament experts, ambassadors, academics, civil society activists and journalists. For one session, they joined the participants in the WFUNA Human Rights Seminar for a joint discussion on the Human Right to Peace. On the last day they had a “brainstorming” session to consider how to work together in the future.
At their own initiative a group of students from Germany participated in the program of activities and filmed the proceedings. A short video was shown on Youtube and the final documentary will be made available shortly on www.disarmamenthub.org.
The Ambassadors of Belgium and Sweden hosted luncheons for the students and WFUNA staff.
Highlights of the program were as follows:
The session led by Mr. Robert Berg, member of the Board of Directors of WAAS, examined reasons for the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and the danger of an exchange of nuclear weapons in outer space. Mr. Berg proposed that the first step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons was to get the USA and Russia to accept the concept of minimal deterrence. One of the students suggested that both countries could establish a program to do this as part of their wider commitment to fighting terrorism, given that nuclear weapons are not the solution to terrorist threats.
Ms. Kerstin Vignard, of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), facilitated a lively dialogue on the question of how to revive meaningful negotiations on nuclear disarmament at the United Nations. Ambassadors Marius Grinius of Canada, Masood Khan of Pakistan and Hans Dahlgren of Sweden, and Chargé d’Affaires Ahlam Al-Gailani of the Republic of Iraq exchanged views with each other and with the students.
Mr. Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator of the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) emphasized the key roles played by the diplomatic community, parliamentarians, mayors and civil society in nuclear disarmament, as well as the power of youth. The discussion focused on the Nuclear Weapons Convention.
Journalist and author Mr. Phillip Knightley gave an historical account of media coverage of nuclear proliferation. Mr. Knightley and the students discussed, among other issues, the freedom of press and the role played by the internet.
Ms. Susi Snyder, Secretary-General of the Woman’s International Leagues for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), provided an overview of the international disarmament machinery, pointing out the central role of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the activities of the First Committee of the General Assembly. Mr. Colin Archer, Secretary-General of the International Peace Bureau (IPB), focused on the importance of campaigning against nuclear weapons, as not all problems can be solved at the highest level, and provided a history of the nuclear disarmament movement. The session concluded with a conversation with the students, during which the importance of mobilizing today and the role of developing countries regarding nuclear disarmament were discussed.
Mr. Tim Caughley, Director of the Office of Disarmament Affairs, Geneva, reported on the current state of affairs in nuclear disarmament and possible ways of strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will be reviewed in 2010. He highlighted practical questions, such as the costs of, and the timeline for, nuclear disarmament and spoke of the uselessness of having large stocks of nuclear weapons. The students raised questions of compliance, the role of civil society and its access to UN disarmament negotiations, and why more was not done by the UN to ensure that the people suffering from the effects of nuclear weapons were represented at these negotiations.
WFUNA Secretary General, Pera Wells, facilitated the joint-session with the Human Rights Seminar, entitled “In search of a rights based approach to a Nuclear Weapons-Free World”. Dr. Carlos Vilan Duran (Spanish Society for International Human Rights Law; Coordinator of the World Campaign for the Advancement of the Human Right to Peace), introduced the Luarca Declaration on the Human Right to Peace. Professor Alfred de Zayas, and Mr. Tsutomu Kono (Political Affairs Officer at the UN Office for Disarmament) joined in the discussion which concluded that establishing a nuclear weapons-free world needs to be a human right since nuclear weapons pose a fundamental threat to the right to life and all other human rights.
The students concluded their Conference with a “brainstorming” session. They decided to form a group to pursue their vision of a nuclear weapons-free world, strategize on follow-up initiatives to expand the engagement of youth in the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World. Emily Gleason (US) and Sven Sobrie (Belgium) committed themselves to the overall coordination of the group. Other students took on responsibility for tasks such as research, fundraising, constitution writing and public relations. A Students for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World wiki space and Facebook group have been created. The students agreed to work on local and national press releases and will collectively write a letter to high-level UN officials, Heads of government and the US presidential candidates. Emily Gleason wrote to WFUNA after the conference: “I would like to thank all of you for the amazing, life changing opportunity in Geneva” and “we are inspired by all of you, and we have decided that together, we can create change.”
posted 1st July 2008
UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION
(Edinburgh Branch)
ADVANCE NOTICE !!!
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE NPT
A One Day International Conference to Prime the 2010 Review
Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
16th APRIL, 2009, THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, EDINBURGH
Chair: It is hoped that the Conference will be Chaired by The Hon Doug Roche, Hon President of WFUNA, and that he will present the Conference Conclusions to the General Assembly of WFUNA at Seoul in August, 2009)
The Programme mixes KeyNote Lectures by distinguished experts with Round Table Discussions in which UNAs participate.
In 2005 the Review Conference of the NPT was unable to even agree a
final communique. WFUNA will not allow this to happen in 2010.
Please note the date, April 16th. All UNAs welcome. Full details later.
(a.f.gaines@strath.ac.uk <mailto:a.f.gaines@strath.ac.uk> Edinburgh UNA; Nuclear-NonProliferation Working Group)
posted 3rd June,2008
General Assembly
DC/3110/Rev.1**
Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York
Disarmament Commission
2008 Substantive Session
289th Meeting* (PM)
DISARMAMENT COMMISSION CONCLUDES SESSION, THREE-YEAR CYCLE OF DELIBERATIONS
WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT/CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ISSUES
Commission Chairman Says No One Expected ‘A Farewell To Arms’, But Even
Against Low Expectations, Commission Produced ‘A Very Meagre Outcome Indeed’
(Issued on 25 April, delayed for technical reasons.)
The Disarmament Commission concluded its three-week session today by adopting its draft report, as well as those of two subsidiary bodies, working respectively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. The session also marked the conclusion of the Commission’s latest three year-cycle which ran from 2006 to 2008.
Prior to adopting the three reports, the Commission heard Jean-Francis Regis Zinsou (Benin), Chairman of working group I, which considered the agenda item on “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, as he introduced that body’s report.
According to the report, the working group held informal consultations on 18 March, and 12 formal meetings from 9 to 24 April, during which it had before it a working paper submitted by its Chairman. On the basis of extensive discussions and informal consultations, the Chairman presented a revised working paper containing elements that, in his view, could serve as a basis to reach a consensus on recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Following analysis of the subsequent discussions, a final revised working paper was submitted by the Chairman, but the working group was unable to achieve a consensus on it.
The report of working group II, on “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”, was introduced by that body’s Chairman, Carlos Luis Dantas C. Perez ( Brazil). According to the report, the working group held 10 meetings between 9 and 22 April, with the Chairman’s conference room paper as the basis for discussion. In the course of its deliberations, a revised version of the Chairman’s paper was submitted taking into account proposals and changes made by delegations. An annex was subsequently attached to the paper. The working group then considered that latest version of the revised paper, but also failed to achieve consensus.
Introducing the Commission’s draft report, Rapporteur Monica Bolanos Perez ( Guatemala) said that it was a factual description of the Commission’s work and proceedings during the session. The substantive part comprised the reports of the two working groups and was a reflection of the compromises and agreements reached by delegations through delicate negotiations, which had been carried out in the spirit of constructive cooperation. The two reports, incomplete as they were, accurately reflected three years of progress and failure.
Following the Commission’s adoption of the three reports, Chairman Piet de Klerk ( Netherlands) said “nobody expected the UN Disarmament Commission to bring about a farewell to arms, but… even set against the relatively low expectations we had going into this, we came out with a very meagre outcome indeed”.
He said it was a shame that the hard work did not come to fruition, and added that, despite everyone’s commitment, three weeks was “not enough for the Commission to bring results”. Indeed, “three years were not enough. Nearly a decade was not enough, a decade of disarray”. As the lean years passed, he noted, both expectations and attendance had dropped. At the same time, worryingly, the urgency of the issues had only increased.
There was a stark contrast between the state of the world and the cooperation of the United Nations Member States in the Commission, he said. Therefore, the credibility question was “inescapable, and in time, each and every one of us should be able to answer it”. He promised to be at the disposal of the members for any suggestions they might have regarding the agenda of the Commissions next sessions, and the future. “This question is still open,” he said, adding, “we should not again let two years pass before we can agree on an agenda. Hopefully we can agree, in consultations to be held, on a new agenda before the introduction of a resolution in the First Committee in the fall”.
He said that, however, not all was negative; “we are not leaving the room empty-handed. After all, this is a deliberative organ and we did deliberate”. He pointed to valuable exchanges of views and expressions of opinions on some of the most crucial issues of the day, perhaps even on topics of the highest importance. Members had worked seriously towards consensus, but that consensus had eluded them. Even without consensual conclusions, however, that process counted for something. “Maybe that in itself is a confidence-building measure,” he said.
The Commission also heard concluding remarks by the representatives of Slovenia (on behalf of the European Union), Indonesia (on behalf of the non-aligned movement), India, Pakistan, Norway, Nigeria, China, Iran, Ireland, Cuba, Israel, Russian federation and Syria (on behalf of the Arab States). The representative of Iran took the floor a second time to clarify his position in regard to the statement made by the representative of Israel.
The Disarmament Commission will meet again on a date and time to be announced.
* *** *
__________
* The 288th Meeting was not covered.
** Reissued to reflect Chairman’s statement as delivered.
For information media • not an official record
Posted 5th April,2008
http://youtube.com/watch?v=4HD0T8jv_ZI&feature=related
Posted 17/2/2008
Ministry of Defence
30th January, 2008
Thank you for your letter of 14 January enclosing further correspondence from Alec Gaines of the United Nations Association, Edinburgh, about various matters relating to disarmament.
I am disappointed that Mr Gaines feels that the Government shows little sense of urgency in pursuing our goal of a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons. We take the issue of nuclear disarmament very seriously. We have made it clear on many occasions that we remain fully committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT), which we regard as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Indeed the then Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett speaking to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washingron on 25 June 2007 noted that the debate on disarmament and non-proliferation has become “more immediate and more urgent”.
The UK has already made substantial reductions in its holdings of nuclear weapons. We are the only recognised nuclear weapons State to have reduced its nuclear deterrent capacity to a single system which is based on the Trident D5 missile. In line with the announcement in the December 2006 white paper: “The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent” (Cm 6994), the UK’s stockpile of operationally available warheads has been reduced to fewer than 160. This means that since the end of the Cold War the UK has reduced the explosive power of its nuclear deterrent capability by over 75%. These are significant initiatives and commitment towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.
Mr. Gaines’ references to Russian bombers invading our airspace suggests a misunderstanding of the actual position and of my previous letter. As I said then, there has been an increase in the number of Russian military aircraft approaching the NATO policed international airspace for which the UK has responsibility. We have reacted appropriately. On 17 August last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was resuming, on a permanent basis, regular flights by its strategic aviation bombers, which had been effectively dormant since 1992, and commented, “we hope our partners will treat this with understanding”. The resumption of these flights has been reported in the UK media as a return to the Cold War, This is not the case. All countries have the right to maintain or upgrade and exercise their defence capabilities. The training flights are being conducted in international airspace, which the Russians are perfectly entitled to do, just as UK military aircraft sometimes conduct flights in international airspace adjacent to other countries.
We launch our Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft, under current procedures, primarily for identification purposes. The only means available to assess whether the Russian aircraft are carrying weapons is a visual inspection by the QRA intercepting crews. As the Russian aircraft have internal bomb bays, intercepting aircrews have only been able to confirm that no external weapons are carried. The Bear aircraft is equipped with a defensive tail mounted canon, but it is not known if this is loaded with ammunition. We do not assess that these flights constitute a military threat to the UK.
With regard to Mr. Gaines’ comment on Russian missiles, and the detection of possible missile launches, the RAF Flyingdales early warning radar regularly receives alerts of missile launches and contributes, where appropriate, to an immediate assessment of the likelihood that these launches pose a threat to the United Kingdom and its deployed forces. Similarly, any satellite early warning data would be routed through RAF Menwith Hill to the United States missile defence system should such a launch be detected.
Mr Gaines also asks about the UK’s co-operation with certain countries to improve mutual nuclear defence. The only co-operation of this kind that the UK has is with NATO. Although the UK’s nuclear weapons are assigned to NATO, please reassure Mr Gaines that the weapons remain under UK national control at all times and only the Prime Minister can authorise their use. Separate to the multilateral |NATO co-operation, the UK also co-operates bilaterally with the US on certain nuclear technical and procurement issues under the terms of the 1958 UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement.
While the UK does not have mutual nuclear defence agreements with nations outside of NATO, we do hold regular discussions with Russia, China, India, Israel and Pakistan, and of course the wider UN membership, on the full range of nuclear disarmament issues through our participation in, amongst others, the NPT, the Conference on Disarmament, the UN Disarmament Committee and the UN First Committee. In the case of Russia, the UK works bilaterally, and through the NATO Russia Council, with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation over areas of mutual interest to counter common security challenges and risks that our nations face. Our aim is to strengthen international peace and security.
Finally, the UK maintains a ‘Continuous At Sea Deterrence’ posture, which means that one vanguard class submarine with Trident missiles is always on deterrent patrol. We have no intention of inviting other nations to carry out spot checks of our nuclear deterrent.
I hope this explains the position.
Bob Ainsworth
Minister of State for the Armed Forces
posted January 5th, 2008
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Security Policy Group.
19 November, 2007
Dear Mr Gaines,
Thank you very much for your letter of 1 October to Jim Murphy, the Minister of State, in which you ask about the Government’s policy on multilateral disarmament. You also express your concerns about the Government’s agreement to the use of RAF Menwith Hill for relaying satellite data to the US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. As an official within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Security Policy Department, I have been asked to reply.
On your first point, I can assure you that our overarching policy remains working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons. The UK has taken a large number of unilateral and multilateral steps in full support of our disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As announced in our recent White Paper “The future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Detererent” we are cutting our stockpile of operationally available warheads by 20 percent, to fewer than 160. This will result in a total reduction in the explosive power of UK nuclear weapons by 75 percent since the end of the Cold War.
We continue to push for negotiations on a Fissile Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) within the Conference on Disarmament. We continue to call on all states that have not yet done so to follow our example and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). We have alongside our EU partners, publicly stressed the need for further progress in nuclear disarmament. And we continue to engage with both the Us and Russia, calling on them to reduce the nuclear arsenals to the current bilateral arms reduction treaties. We have also made clear our willingness to discuss with other nuclear weapons states confidence building measures on nuclear disarmament.
In a speech given on 25 June to the Carnegie International Endowment for International Peace, the former Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, announced that the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston would be taking forward detailed work on key stages in the verification of the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. We are also supporting an in-depth study by the Independent International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) to help determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. In particular, we are working with IISS on holding a workshop to focus on some of the crucial technical questions in this area.
On the Government’s decision to allow the use of RAF Menwith Hill for relaying satellite data to the US BMD system, parliament has the opportunity regulalrly to question Defence Ministers on missile defence, both in writing and orally. The key principles underpinning the use of bases in the UK to support the US BMD system have been debated in detail.
The original decision to allow its use as a relay station for satellite data was taken in 1997, by the previous Government. At that time, the purpose of the relay station was, and remains, to provide the UK and the US with warning of missile attack on our countries. What we agreed recently was that the US can use this same satellite data in their missile defence system. The Secretary of State, Des Browne, informed the House of this change.
I should also make clear that the US BMD system is not a nuclear system. The US plan to deploy kinetic energy interceptors into Europe to defend against a ballistic missile attack from the Middle East. These interceptors are designed for defensive purposes only and are in no sense nuclear weapons. They contain no warhead nuclear or otherwise.
The UK makes a contribution to the US missile defence system through our operation of the radar at RAF Flyingdales, the data relay station at RAF Menwith Hill and our well-established technical co-operation programmes. Discussions on additional support are at an early stage, and no decisions have been taken on whether or not any further ballistic missile elements might be based in the UK, or where they might be sited. US negotiations on the siting of missile defence assets in Europe are on a bilateral basis with the host nations. The UK is therefore not involved in these negotiations although the US does discuss plans for missile defence with NATO.
You express your concerns about Russia’s resumption of its Russian strategic overflights. Russia has consistently opposed US Missile Defence plans. The US has made clear that this system is in no way aimed at Russia. The US system is designed only to deal with a limited number of missiles that may be launched by states of concern. It is not a nuclear system and has no offensive capability. Those countries ready to participate in missile defence are responding to the emerging threat of a ballistic missile attack. The US is engaged in bilateral discussions with Russia on this issue. NATO also engages Russia on missile defence through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).
It is noteworthy that Russia has tempered its statements about targeting Europe in response to US plans, and is now offering to co-operate with the US. We want to work constructively with them to see what missile defence can do for all European nations.
The UK Government does not accept the contention that limited deployment of ballistic missile interceptors in Europe creates any sort of security risk to Europe, or threaten strategic stability within the region in any way. The legitimate security concern is the developing ballisitc missile threat that Europe faces from the ballistic missile programmes in other regions. Missile defence is a response to, not the cause of ,the problem.
I hope this helps to answer your concerns.
Louise McCollin (Security Policy Group)
US. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Disarmament and Non-Nuclear Stability in Tomorrow’s World
Dr. Christopher A. Ford, US Special Representative for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Nagasaki, August 31st, 2007)
Thank you for the chance to address you today. It is a sobering task to address the issue of nuclear disarmament in one of the two places on Earth to have felt the terrible power of nuclear energy used in war, but I am grateful for the chance to offer some thoughts on the subject. As I emphasised in a United Nations Conference in Sapporo earlier this week, it is very important to devote serious attention to realistic and practical thinking about how we can create the conditions that would allow the achievement of total nuclear disarmament. Supporters of disarmament must work to ensure that they can provide persuasive answers to hard-nosed skeptics who contend that disarmament is a naïve dream – or worse, a dangerous delusion. I find it encouraging that there seems to be increasing interest in undertaking serious study of the very challenging questions that arise when one considers how to make total nuclear disarmament a realistic and plausible policy option in the real world.
The United States has, on multiple occasions, offered its thoughts on the kind of international security it would be necessary to create for total nuclear disarmament to become practical and realistic. If you are not familiar with this work, I would encourage you to become so: our papers and comments are available on the “NPT Review Cycle” website of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the US State Department. We do not intend these positions to be definitive statements for all time on such issues, but we do hope that they will serve as the beginning of an ongoing dialogue, as the international community works to think through some of these questions.
Today, I would like to offer some thoughts on one of the thorniest challenges that advocates of disarmament face: ensuring that a future world that has taken what Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev once briefly considered as the so-called “zero option” remains reliably at zero over time. This is a formidable challenge, for logic suggests that as the number of nuclear weapons decreases, the “marginal utility” of a nuclear weapon as an instrument of military power increases. At the extreme, which is precisely disarmament’s hope to create, the strategic utility of even one or two nuclear weapons would be huge. As we sit here today in Nagasaki, of all places , one needs little reminder that a country that possesses the only nuclear weapons in the world sits in a position of extraordinary power. This is a sobering fact with which advocates of disarmament must wrestle, because it means that the very achievement of total nuclear disarmament could greatly increase the incentives for nuclear proliferation. It is therefore vital for any zero option regime to be able to provide rock-solid assurances that it will be able to deter – and, if necessary respond to – attempts to achieve “breakout” from a disarmament regime by suddenly beginning to produce nuclear weapons and thereby seize strategic advantage.
This is the challenge I would like to discuss today., for I think that too little serious attention has been paid to this problem. Most discussions that I have heard about a zero-option world seek to answer this question – when, indeed, they do at all – simply by declaring that the UN Security Council needs to be reformed and empowered to enable it to take swift and effective action against a country that attempts to subvert the disarmament regime. An effective Security Council, I believe, must indeed be part of the solution if the zero-option is to be taken seriously, but I am afraid that without a good deal more, this will not be sufficient to address the task at hand.
Specifically, solutions that posit a rapid and reliable Security Council as a sort of deux ex machina that will step in, where needed, to solve disarmament’s ”breakout” problems smack too much of a medicinal cure that presumes the disease to already be in remission. A world in which the permanent and rotating members of the Council will agree swiftly on action to deter and respond to any “breakout” attempt – and in which all governments will be ready and willing quickly to translate Security Council requirements and exhortations into effective concrete steps toward these ends – already would be one in which such dramatic steps would be less necessary than they are in the untidy world of today. To put it brutally, if the international community were harmonious enough to be capable of acting together so rapidly, reliably, and effectively in a multilateral forum such as the Security Council, there would probably be less need for the Council to act in the first place. In a world which has not been fully purged of ambiguity, complexity and contestation, a credible “zero-option” regime must be able to provide some assurances against breakout that do not presuppose both a swift and resolute international consensus against any suspected violator and an unwavering willingness to bear the burdens of decisive response.
More is probably needed. Friends of disarmament must be able to articulate a broader vision of deterrence within the context of a zero-option world, a vision which does not depend exclusively upon international consensus to ride to the rescue when problems arise. In our discussions of these matters, the US Government has offered some tentative thoughts on this subject, which I would like briefly to outline for you.
We have spoken repeatedly of the importance of developing non-nuclear means of strategic deterrence. This is today an important focus of US strategic policy. Since our 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, we have been working diligently to develop and improve means of accomplishing strategic deterrent goals that no longer – as in years past- rely exclusively upon nuclear weaponry. Today, we are developing a “New Triad” of nuclear and non-nuclear strike systems, defensive measures, and improved industrial infrastructure, intelligence, and command-and-control architectures that is reducing our reliance upon the traditional Cold War “Triad” of land-based missiles, bombers, and missile carrying submarines. The crucial element for the purposes of our discussions today ,of course, is that of non-nuclear deterrent means: we seek better ways to accomplish , without nuclear weapons, strategic deterrent missions that previously could only be achieved with such weapons.
This thrust is of obvious importance to the process of achieving nuclear disarmament, but it also has implications for stability in a non-nuclear weapons world. Such improved capabilities, after all, not only speak to how to make nuclear weapons seem less necessary, but also can help provide an answer to the challenge of how to convince a would-be violator that attempting “breakout” from a zero-option regime would be very much against its interests. Post-nuclear deterrent capabilities, in other words, could make nuclear weapons seem both less necessary for today’s possessors and less attractive for those who might consider them tomorrow.
We also have spoken of the link between disarmament stability and the development and improvement of ballistic missile defences and other means of defeating WMD delivery. Such capabilities can, I believe, powerfully contribute to stability in a zero-option world in two ways. First, by making it harder to deliver to a target any nuclear weapon that is developed in violation of a zero-weapons regime, defences would reduce the anticipated strategic utility of such weapons, making “breakout” less attractive and therefore possibly less likely. Even If defences could at some point be surmounted, the existence of relatively robust defensive networks around the world could ,at the very least, buy time in which the international community could rally to develop or implement other means of responding to the threat. As we have seen with the world’s painfully slow responses to the ongoing threats posed by the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programme, the international community does not always act decisively and swiftly. It could be valuable indeed to have a little more time before a violator could fully realise strategic benefits from zero-option “breakout”.
Finally, I would like to say a word about another factor that we have noted: the possibility that the potential availability of countervailing reconstitution would need to be part of deterring “breakout” from a zero-weapons regime. Already this possibility has been incorporated explicitly into US nuclear weapons planning as a way to provide a “hedge” against a technical surprise or geopolitical risk. As directed by President Bush, and later codified in the Moscow Treaty, we are steadily reducing our numbers of “operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons” toward the band of target numbers set by that agreement for the year 2012. At the same time, we are continuing with – and indeed accelerating – our programme for dismantling nuclear weapons. We are not yet, however, dismantling every single warhead that we remove from “operationally destroyed” status. For now, at least, we feel it necessary to keep some warheads in existence, but in a nondeployed status, in case some unanticipated unfavorable change should occur in the strategic environment or a technical problem arise with any of our delivery systems or warheads that would render that portion of our deterrent ineffective.
We are working, however, to make our “hedge” of non-deployed “weapons-in-being” less necessary – and thus to permit further reductions in our total stockpile of warheads. This is a slow and expensive process, but the “Complex 2030” program of the US. National Nuclear Security Administration is designed to shrink and modernize our nuclear weapons infrastructure in such a way that we would feel more secure in the future without maintaining today’s numbers of non-deployed weapons. In short, we anticipate that a smaller but more responsive infrastructure will enable us to manage the geopolitical and technical risks associated with a smaller nuclear force, thus making that smaller force feasible. The possibility of countervailing reconstitution, in other words, is already promoting disarmament because it is helping us move towards a posture in which we can reduce the number of nuclear warheads in existence as we feel less need to maintain weapons-in-being as a “hedge” against unforeseen changes in the strategic threat environment or technical surprise.
These issues will, of course, require much more study, but I believe we should not ignore the possibility that this principle might be applied in order to help current nuclear weapons states reach “zero” and to deter “breakout” in a zero-option world. In other words, every current nuclear weapons state’s strategic “hedge” ultimately could move entirely into productive capacity. This could make nuclear disarmament seem less potentially threatening to them, thereby helping to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. It also could help sustain a zero-option regime by confronting a would-be violator with the unpleasant prospect that if it broke the rules by trying to develop nuclear weapons, it would quickly be confronted by countervailing arsenals.
This is not a principle that could safely be generalised, of course, any more than I think the universal availability of fissile-material production capabilities in today’s world could safely be contemplated alongside meaningful nonproliferation assurances. Strategies that manage risk through a responsive production base rather than weapons-in-being, however, might offer friends of disarmament a way to respond to the challenge of keeping a zero-option regime alive in the face of the proliferation incentives that such a regime would itself help to increase. It is, at any rate, food for thought.
Having offered these suggestions, let me wrap up by sharing a more personal thought. I have with me today a very kind gift that I received last April from the Mayor of the City of Hiroshima. It is a small tapestry depicting the Atomic Bomb Dome, a World Heritage Site that now forms the centrepiece of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and lies near the cenotaph of the victims of the bombings of August1945. I have carefully kept this gift, and I brought it with me on this trip, because it helps keep me focused upon two important points. Most obviously, it is a sobering reminder from the past for disarmament advocates, nonproliferation experts, and deterrence strategists alike.
But I also keep this tapestry because the costly closing act of the long and ugly saga of the Second World War reminds me of how rooted disarmament issues necessarily are in the broader context of international tension and conflict – and of how important it is that we address disarmament issues with the thoughtfulness that they deserve in all the complexities of this context. This piece of cloth thus has been valuable to me not only as a warning but also as a source of inspiration and hope that our collective wisdom will prove equal to the task.
I have tried today to sketch out some ways in which it might be possible to help answer the questions that must be addressed if we are serious about trying to move toward a disarmed world. I do not expect that everyone will necessarily agree with these ideas. But I hope there is no disagreement on the importance of addressing as closely and realistically as we can the challenges that would be entailed in achieving and sustaining the elimination of nuclear weapons in our decidedly complicated world.
There could hardly be a more appropriate place to rededicate ourselves to this goal than here in Nagasaki.
Thank you.
Posted 20/12/07
The following letter is a new important, informative and courteous letter that the Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth, the Minister for the Armed Services wrote to John Thurso MP (and which John Thurso kindly copied to us).
Notice that the letter, perhaps because Bob Ainsworth is being courteous, is lacking in urgency; it shows the UK Government making little real progress towards multilateral disarmament this year. The letter reminds us that Russia and the US have undertaken to reduce their numbers of nuclear missiles to (only!!) 2200 by 2012 but it gives no evidence that this has started to happen. Indeed, the November 'Scientific American' (available on most bookstalls) gives details of both Russia and the US designing new generations of missiles.
Perhaps the most encouraging part of Bob Ainsworth's letter is at the end when we are told that Russia may be starting to collaborate with us on defence against nuclear attack. Collaboration should be encouraged, we are on the same side !
The Branch will be thanking John Thurso and sending him our comments. The Branch has recently written to the Ambassadors of each of the nuclear powers asking straightforwadly what they have done/are doing towards nuclear disarmament.
John Thurso MP MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
28TH November,2007
Dear John
Thank you for your letter of 9th October enclosing correspondence from the United Nations Association, Edinburgh about various matters related to the nuclear deterrent, non-proliferation and ballistic missile defence.
As you will be aware, on 14March the House of Commons debated the issue of the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, and following a lengthy and full debate, voted to support the Government’s proposals for maintaining the capability by procuring a new class of submarines to replace the Vanguard class and to participate in a programme to extend the life of the Trident II D5 missile. In supporting the Government’s motion, the House also endorsed the decision to take further steps towards meeting the UK’s disarmament responsibilities under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The primary responsibility of any government is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. For 50 years our independent nuclear deterrent has provided the ultimate assurance of our national security. In terms of their destructive power, nuclear weapons pose a uniquely terrible threat and consequently have a capability to deter acts of aggression that is of a completely different scale to any other form of deterrence. Nuclear weapons remain a necessary element of the capability the UK needs to deter threats from others possessing nuclear weapons. Should there be a fundamental change for the better in the strategic environment and, in particular, significant further progress on non-proliferation and disarmament, it would obviously be right for future governments to look at this again.
As far as Mr Gaines point about the nuclear posture of the US and Russia is concerned, this is, of course, a matter for those governments. However, the UK welcomes the series of bilateral agreements which have resulted in substantial reductions in their major nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War. These have produced significant results; by 2012 the United States nuclear stockpile will have been reduced to around one quarter of what it was in 1990. Under the terms of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty Russia is making parallel cuts. We have, alongside our EU partners, continued to encourage Russia and the US to make further bilateral progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals.
Our overall position on nuclear disarmament has not changed with the publishing of the 2006 White Paper. We are committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons and continue to play a full role in international efforts to strengthen arms control and prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
We have made clear that when it will be useful to include in any negotiations the one percent of the world’s nuclear weapons that belong to the UK, we will willingly do so. However, to reach that point would require much more disarmament diplomacy. It would require a much more secure and predictable global political context. That context does not exist today. The continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability is likely to remain a necessary element of our security.
We are very keen to get the Conference on Disarmament (CD) back to substantive work and we will be working hard to this end as part of next year’s CD Presidency Platform. We hope that all CD Member States will accept the very broad mandate that has been proposed and agree to open negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty without preconditions, towards a treaty without delay. This remains the multilateral disarmament priority for the UK. We believe that capping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons is the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament. We have been very encouraged by the progress made in the CD this year but unfortunately a very small minority of states continue to block progress. The UK is working hard to urge those few remaining states to join the consensus.
The UK ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1998 and has maintained a moratorium on conducting nuclear explosions since 1991. We are committed to the CTBT and to its entry into force as early as possible. We have urged all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty unconditionally and without delay, in particular the ten remaining Annex 2 countries. This would be an important step towards universalisation of the CTBT and would send a positive signal for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as a whole. We welcome the fact that, while several countries have not yet felt able to ratify the Treaty, they are nonetheless maintaining moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions and other nuclear explosions (apart from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).
The original decision to allow the US to use RAF Menwith Hill as a relay station for satellite data was taken in 1997. The purpose of the relay station is to provide the US and the UK with warning of missile attack. What the Government agreed recently was that the US can use this same satellite data in its missile defence system; a system that did not exist at the time of the original agreement.
Russia has been, and will continue to be, informed of US plans for extending their missile defence system into Europe. Moreover, Russia is already working closely with NATO to examine the potential for interoperability of Russian and NATO theatre missile defence systems. It is noteworthy that Russia is now offering to cooperate with the US in this area, and that the US is offering a greater role than was previously envisaged for Russia in the creation of a ballistic missile defence system that protects not only the US, but Russia and Europe. The UK continues to work constructively with all interested parties on missile defence; it would be irresponsible of the Government not to explore with our allies the implications that the missile defence system might offer for the security of the UK.
In recent weeks we have seen an increase in the number of Russian military aircraft approaching the NATO-policed international airspace area for which the UK has responsibility. On each occasion we have launched Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) fighters, including the first operational use of the RAF Typhoon, to monitor and escort the Russian aircraft as they have transited through this airspace. It should also be noted that the Russians have regularly but never continuously , flown aircraft in the vicinity of United Kingdom airspace for many years, and that this activity is not a direct response to the US plans for ballistic missile defence. The challenge facing Russia, and the UK, is to use our capabilities to improve international security and stability. Continued engagement, through our defence cooperation programme, helps us to build confidence and to understand these actions in the context of Russian domestic politics.
I hope this is helpful.
Yours,
The Rt. Hon. Bob Ainsworth ,MP. ,Minister for the Armed Forces.